Monthly newsletter of the tuna fishing industry

As of mid June 2002, the price of tuna in Bangkok remains at about $680-$690 per Metric Ton for 4 to
7.5lbs Skipjack. In Samoa, the price of Skipjack 4-7.5lbs is $575-$610 per short ton. In Ecuador, about
$690- $730 per Metric Ton for 4 to 7.5lbs Skipjack and about $920-$950 per Metric Ton for +2Olbs
Yellowfin. In Colombia, the price of Yellowfin +20lbs is about $950-$980 per Metric Ton. In Costa Rica,
about $910-$940 per Metric Ton for +20lbs Yellowfin. In Mexico, the price of Yellowfin is about
$850-$910 per Metric Ton.

Tuna vessel operators are losing patience over the consistently low price of tuna. Except for the depressed
years 1999 to early 2001, prices of tuna have always fluctuated over some reasonable index (around $750
per Metric Ton) with price advantages being passed between producers and buyers as prices went up or
down. For the most part, this kept the industry healthy for over 40 years. Today, there is no reasonable
basis for its pricing. There is no margin left for tuna vessels to survive any changes in trade , economic, and
environmental policies that are believed to take effect in the coming months. WTPO is calling an
emergency meeting on the week of June 17, 2002, to reach a solution to this problem by trying to curb
supply.

The European Commission is proposing to cut at least 30% of Europe's fishing fleet. This would include
the elimination of subsidies to upgrade vessels or to build new ones. Spain, currently receiving about Euro
300 million a year to aid its fishing industry, is crying "foul." Additional proposals include cutting so-called
"fishing efforts," which suggests the amount of time the fishing vessels spend out at sea and tonnage
capacities. Spain is not the only opponent. Portugal claims that this will kill whatever is left of its fishing
industry. The commission itself faces some image problems. It is believed that the ouster of former director
general of its fisheries department, Mr. Steffen Smidt, was in response to Spanish pressure. The
commission is hard-pressed to prove that it is not so. This proposal may end up in a deadlock or a milder
version that will leave the subsidies as a way to support local shipyards or shipbuilders.

In the United States Senate, the extension of the so-called Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) is still
waiting to pass. This measure will have positive effects in the Ecuadorean tuna industry since tuna is said to
be added to the new version and will enter the United States tariff-free, just like flowers and some
vegetables. The measure was first initiated in 1991 to reduce cocaine production in Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Bolivia. The Andean Trade Preference Act expired in December 4, 2001. This bill, which was
supposed to be passed last year, has taken a back seat since September 11. The focus of the bill has
changed to the war on terrorism and its network in the Middle East and Asia.

The Philippines, fighting side-by-side with America, has also asked a tarriff advantage for its own tuna
products. The Philippines tuna capital, General Santos, is located close to the
campground-turned-battleground of an Al-Qaeda- related group called the "Abu Sayyaf." In the last few
months, the area suffered some casualties and damage when it was attacked by rebel forces, The United
States government is said to have responded positively to the tarriff request. The measure has to pass the
US. Senate. It may or may not affect the tuna quota to be allocated to the countries in the Andean Trade
Pact.

After years of right-sizing, speculations, scandals, and crew member lawsuits, Heinz decided to swap
Star-Kist and a few other brands for a majority interest in Del Monte. Even with Star-kist's successful
sales promotions, innovative product introductions, and cash flow, many thought that it was just too
controversial for Heinz's more urbane image,

Both Del Monte and Star-Kist began as packers on the California coast in the early 1900s. Although the
Del Monte brand traces back its use to 1892, it incorporated itself as Califlomia Packing Corp. in 1916.
Star-Kist brought one of the first groups
of migrant workers to Long Beach, California to work in its canneries. In the 1980s, Heinz helped turn
Star-Kist into the Number 1 brand of canned tuna in the United States.

Beyond the fascination, Star-Kist needs Del Monte's political support and business expertise in many third
world countries where tuna are caught and packed. Del Monte plantations and packing plants are major
employers in many third world economies. Succumbing to Heinz pressure to lower its operating costs and
raise cash for its acquisitions, Star-Kist sold its tuna fishing fleet and shut down most of its canneries. Prior
to this announcement, there had been growing speculation that Star-Kist would be nothing more than a
trading company slapping its label on cans of tuna from the cheapest producers from around the world.
Under Del Monte, Star-Kist becomes part of a company known for its innovative packing. It has been
some time since Star-Kist announced minimal impact on its workforce. It is not yet known whether
Star-Kist will move its offices to San Francisco where Del Monte is based or whether it will have its own
location possibly closer to its No. 2 and No. 3 rivals, BumbleBee and Chicken of the Sea, in Southern
California. It has been reported that Del Monte will assume $1.1 billion in debt and pay down an additional
$1 billion in debt by the end of fiscal 2005. Del Monte chairman and chief executive Richard Wolford will
retain his post. After the merger, Del Monte becomes a US$3.1 billion business, $1.6 billion more than its
sales in the fiscal year ended June 30.